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BLOOD ON THE CROSS 
Dutch role in hostage crisis 
PAUL B R O U W E R , then Ambassador for the Netherlands in Indonesia, 
tells in the Dutch radio programme Argos (5 November 1999) about the 
good cooperation between the Indonesians, British and Dutch. 
A translation: 
Brouwer: / had two people detached there who took turns. The 
experience is that in such a place you are so much under pressure that you 
have to get out from time to time. Therefore, I had there alternately the 
military attache, Colonel De Mars, and the head of the consular depart-
ment, for those contacts and to be present constantly with the consultations, 
to take part in the briefings, the preparations, and to partake in all the 
dealings. Of course, those two were in continuous contact with the Embassy 
through direct lines. And also very close with the British who did it in exactly 
the same way. Also, because on the spot things were very informal: a feeling 
of solidarity developed there rather quickly — that they were together 
settling a case. 
A R G O S : This means that the different steps that were taken were 
thoroughly considered/shared? 
Brouwer: There was good consultation. 
A R G O S : It was not so that Indonesia was the boss? 
Brouwer: No, no, no, certainly not. There was good consultation, both 
with the Red Cross and with the military. And certainly too with the British. 
Regarding the British and the Netherlands: for five months we dealt with 
that case in complete solidarity. 
A R G O S : Was that also true for the last steps? 
Brouwer: That was especially true for Jakarta where the British 
Ambassador and I had daily, sometimes several times a day, contact. It was 
clear that this was a case that concerned both of us together, also at the 
highest level of the Ambassador. We needed it because of the political 
attention on the case, but also to be able to have contact with the military 
about this. Especially in Indonesia, this was of course very important. 
A R G O S : Does this also mean that there has been extensive consulta-
tion concerning the final solution that was chosen, the military intervention? 
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Brouwer: When the Red Cross, during the so-called pig feast in 
Geselema, was confronted with the ultimate, blunt refusal of that one 
hostage-taker, the leader, to cooperate... 
A R G O S : ...Kelly Kwalik... 
Brouwer:... Yes... then it was clear to everybody on the ground, based 
on a communal evaluation: we could never get further than this . And if it 
breaks here, then we couldn't see how to solve this in a negotiated peaceful 
manner. And then this Indonesian military operation took off. 
A R G O S : So, in that morning of 9 May 1996, it became clear: there 
would be a military intervention? 
Brouwer: Yes. 
A R G O S : And you were part of that decision-making? 
Brouwer: Of course, things happened very quickly that day. Commu-
nication was always a problem. But that had been clear before. Because we 
all had, of course, several scenarios about what to do if it all broke down? 
Therefore, the Indonesian army had been preparing itself for the possibility 
that an action might be necessary. But there was a very clear mutual 
understanding that the Indonesian army would not start an action on its own 
initiative. 
A R G O S : Was the Netherlands involved in the nature of the military 
intervention? At some stage it must be clear that it was going to happen. But 
what exactly was going to happen and the way in which it would happen, 
was the Netherlands involved in this? 
Brouwer: No. Except that De Mars being on the spot, of course, had 
good contact with the Indonesian operational troops and had informal talks 
with them, we have not been involved officially in the way it was going to 
happen that day. At least, in the first instance it was their action. But that 
doesn 't mean to say that we didn 't want to be there and didn 't want to know 
what happened. 
• Translation provided by by Ottis Simopiaref of the Papuan People's 
Foundation Study and Information Centre. 0ttismanswam@netscape.net 
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